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ABSTRACT
A passive local eavesdropper can leverage Website Fingerprinting
(WF) to deanonymize the web browsing activity of Tor users. The
value of timing information to WF has often been discounted in
recent works due to the volatility of low-level timing information.
In this paper, we more carefully examine the extent to which packet
timing can be used to facilitate WF attacks. We first propose a new
set of timing-related features based on burst-level characteristics to
further identify more ways that timing patterns could be used by
classifiers to identify sites. Then we evaluate the effectiveness of
both raw timing and directional timing which is a combination of
raw timing and direction in a deep-learning-based WF attack. Our
closed-world evaluation shows that directional timing performs
best in most of the settings we explored, achieving: (i) 98.4% in un-
defended Tor traffic; (ii) 93.5% on WTF-PAD traffic, several points
higher than when only directional information is used; and (iii)
64.7% against onion sites, 12% higher than using only direction.
Further evaluations in the open-world setting show small increases
in both precision (+2%) and recall (+6%) with directional-timing
on WTF-PAD traffic. To further investigate the value of timing
information, we perform an information leakage analysis on our
proposed handcrafted features. Our results show that while timing
features leak less information than directional features, the informa-
tion contained in each feature is mutually exclusive to one another
and can thus improve the robustness of a classifier.
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1 INTRODUCTION
With over eight million daily users [20], Tor has become one of the
most popular technologies to protect users’ privacy on the Internet.
As shown in Figure 1, a Tor user protects her privacy by creating
an encrypted circuit consisting of three nodes: a guard, a middle,
and an exit. User traffic is then passed through these nodes before
reaching its final destination. In this design, no single Tor node
or eavesdropper should be able to link the user’s identity (i.e. IP
address and location) with the websites she visits.
Unfortunately, prior work has shown that Tor is prone to a class
of traffic analysis attacks called website fingerprinting (WF) [4, 10,
Figure 1: Website fingerprinting threat model.
23, 26, 27, 29, 31]. The WF attack allows an adversary to learn infor-
mation about the client’s online activities even though the traffic
is encrypted. To perform the attack, a passive local eavesdropper
collects side-channel information from the network traffic between
the client and entry node, as shown in Figure 1. From the collected
traffic, the attacker then extracts various features, such as packet
statistics or traffic burst patterns, and feeds this information into
a machine learning classifier to identify which website the client
has visited. Prior work has shown that this kind of attack is very
effective, reaching up to 98% accuracy [29].
In response, the Tor Project community has become greatly
concerned with designing new effective defenses against these WF
attacks [25, 26]. The state-of-the-art attacks emphasize bursts as
powerful features used to classify the encrypted traces. Bursts are
groups of consecutive packets going in the same direction, either
outgoing from the client to the web server or incoming from the
server to the client (see Figure 2). Thus, most WF defenses primarily
seek to obscure these burst patterns.
This approach, however, leaves the timing of packets as a largely
unprotected source of information for WF attacks to exploit. More-
over, prior work in WF often discounted timing as being not a
serious threat [33] or found that the contribution of timing was not
significant enough when compared to other features to warrant its
use [10]. The intuitive explanation for this comes from the fact that
timing characteristics are subject to high levels of noise due to many
factors, such as varying bandwidth capacity on different circuits.
Thus, it appears to be difficult to extract consistent patterns from
packet timing that can be used effectively to train WF classifiers.
In this work, we investigate new ways timing information can be
used in WF attacks, and we find that timing offers significant value
to classification.
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Figure 2: A visualization of bursts, with five outgoing bursts
interspersed with five incoming bursts.
The key contributions of our work are as follows:
• We develop new burst-level timing features and compare
them to prior handcrafted features using the WeFDE [19]
information leakage analysis framework. We show that
these features are relatively distinct from previously stud-
ied features and contribute to the robustness of the classi-
fier.
• We propose the use of a new data representation for the
Deep Fingerprinting (DF) [29] attack and investigate its
effects. This new representation, which we refer to as the
Tik-Tok attack, achieves modest accuracy improvement
over direction-only information in several settings. In par-
ticular, we reduce classifier error from 9% to 6.5% for WTF-
PAD by using Tik-Tok. Similar performance improvement
is seen in the open-world setting for WTF-PAD in which
precision and recall are improved to 0.979 and 0.745 for
Tik-Tok when tuned for precision.
• We perform the first investigation of the performance of
deep learning classifiers on onion services, finding that the
DF attack gets only 53% accuracy, while raw timing gets
66%.
• Finally, we develop the first full implementation of the
Walkie-Talkie (W-T) defense [33] in Tor and use it to eval-
uate our timing-based attacks. We find that our W-T im-
plementation is largely resistant to these attacks despite
the fact that the defense was not designed to manipulate
timing information. We further discuss our experiences im-
plementing W-T on the live Tor network in the Appendix.
Overall, we find that burst-level timing information can be effec-
tively used as an additional data representation to create an effective
WF attack. Moreover, using timing along with packet direction fur-
ther improves the performance of the attack, especially in the open
world. These results indicate that developers of WF defenses need
to pay more attention to burst-level timing features as another
fingerprintable attribute of users’ traffic.
2 THREAT MODEL
In this work, we follow a WF threat model that has been frequently
applied in the literature [8–11, 23, 27, 29, 31, 32]. We assume that
the attacker is a local and passive network-level adversary. By local,
we mean that the adversary can be anyone who can access the
encrypted streams between the client and the guard, as illustrated
in Figure 1. This could be an eavesdropper who can intercept the
user’s wireless connections, the user’s Internet service provider
(ISP), or any network on the path between the ISP and the guard.
By passive, we mean limiting the capability of the attacker to only
record the encrypted traffic but not delay, drop, modify. We also
assume that a WF attacker does not have the capability to decrypt
the collected encrypted traffic.
In aWF attack, the adversary needs to first train theWF classifier.
To do this, she selects a set of sites that she is interested in classifying
and uses Tor to visit these sites a number of times, capturing the
network trace of each visit as a sample for that site. From this
dataset, she extracts meaningful features and uses them to train
the classifier. Once the classifier is trained, she can perform the
attack. She intercepts the user’s encrypted traffic stream, extracts
the same features as used in training, and applies the classifier on
those features to predict the user’s website.
Due to the requirement of gathering samples of each site of in-
terest, it is impossible to train the classifier to recognize all possible
websites the user might visit. The attacker thus trains the classi-
fier on a limited set of websites called the monitored set. All other
websites form the unmonitored set.
Based on these two sets, researchers have developed two differ-
ent settings in which to evaluate the performance of the attack:
closed-world and open-world. In the closed-world setting, the user
is restricted to visiting only websites in the monitored set. This
assumption is generally unrealistic [13, 26], but it is useful for eval-
uating the quality of machine learning (ML) models and potential
defenses. In the more realistic open-world setting, the user may visit
any website, including both monitored and unmonitored sites. This
setting is more challenging for the adversary, as she must determine
both whether the user is visiting one of the monitored sites and, if
so, which one. Since it is difficult to produce a dataset covering the
entire web, it is common to model the open-world setting by using
a dataset with samples from many more unmonitored sites than the
number of sites in the monitored set. Evaluation in the open-world
setting provides more realistic assessments of the effectiveness of
both attacks and defenses.
3 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
3.1 WF Attacks using Hand-crafted Features
Most prior WF attacks apply machine learning (ML) with hand-
crafted features. In such attacks, the adversary has to perform fea-
ture engineering, which is the process of designing a set of effective
features that can be used to train the classifier.
Many WF attacks on HTTPS rely on packet size [11, 21], but
this is ineffective against Tor, which has fixed-sized cells. Early WF
attacks attempted to use timing information, but to limited success.
In 2005, Bissias et al. [5] proposed an attack that uses inter-packet
delays averaged over the training set as a profile of that site. The
attack is not very effective and was not tested on Tor traffic. In our
work, we propose timing features based on bursts of traffic instead
of individual packet times.
Panchenko et al. propose an attack with a number of features
based on packet volume and packet direction [24]. They used a
support vector machine (SVM) classifier and achieved 55% accuracy
against Tor. Although the paper mentions the use of timing informa-
tion, none of the features are based on timing, and packet frequency
was mentioned as not improving their classification results. In 2012,
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Cai et al. proposed an attack using the Damerau-Levenshtein edit
distance on simplified traffic traces that only indicated the direction
of each packet, i.e. whether it was incoming or outgoing [8]. The
attack reached up to 87% accuracy on Tor.
WF attacks using hand-crafted features have since been im-
proved using better feature sets and different machine learning
algorithms. Four such attacks could attain over 90% accuracy and
have been used as benchmarks for the subsequent research inWF at-
tacks and defenses. In the first part of our work, we have compared
with these attacks to evaluate the utility of our new timing-based
features.
* k-NN. Wang et al. propose an attack using a k-nearest neighbor
(k-NN) classifier on a large feature set [31]. In a closed-world setting
of 100 websites, they achieved over 90% accuracy. This attack was
the first to use a diverse set of features (bursts, packet ordering,
concentration of the packets, number of incoming and outgoing
packets, etc.) from the traffic information in a WF attack on Tor. A
key set of features they identified is based on the pattern of bursts,
while the only timing-related feature is total transmission time.
CUMUL. Using a relatively simple feature set based on packet size,
packet ordering, and packet direction, Panchenko et al. propose an
attack using the SVM classifier [23]. This simple feature set, which
did not including timing information, proved effective, with 92%
accuracy in the closed-world setting.
k-FP. Hayes et al. propose the k−fingerprinting (k-FP) attack,
which uses random decision forests (RDF) to rank the features
before performing classification with k-NN [10]. This attack also
achieved over 90% accuracy in the closed-world setting. Unlike the
other attacks, their work did study timing features. They found
that statistics on packets per second, e.g. the maximum number of
packets sent in one second, were moderately helpful features in clas-
sifying sites. One such feature ranked ninth among all 150 features,
with a fairly large feature importance score of 0.28, while most of
the features ranked between 38 and 50 with feature importance
scores of 0.07 and below. Statistics on inter-packet delays were also
ranked relatively low, between 40-70. In our work, we explore a
novel set of timing features based on bursts of traffic instead of
fixed time intervals or individual packets. We also use histograms to
capture a broader statistical profile than the maximum, minimum,
standard deviation, and quartile statistics primarily used by Hayes
et al.
Wfin. Yan and Kaur recently released a large set of 35,000 features
in their Wfin attack [34, 35]. Their study evaluated the significance
of features in seven distinct WF scenarios, of which two of these
scenarios (S4 and S5) model undefended and defended Tor traffic,
respectively. Wfin achieved 96.8% accuracy against a scenarios like
undefended Tor and 95.4% with Tor-like traffic defended by fixing
the inter-arrival-time for packets. When the authors investigated
the importance ranking of their features, several timing-based fea-
tures appeared in the top 30 (six timing features between #11-30).
Similar to Hayes et al., their timing features focus mostly on packets
per second either across the entire trace or in the first 20 packets.
3.2 WF Attacks using Deep Learning
Recently, deep learning (DL) has become a state-of-the-art tech-
nique in many domains such as image recognition and speech
recognition [18]. A major advantage of DL over traditional ML
techniques is an ability to automatically extract and learn features,
rather than using manual feature engineering. This allows the clas-
sifier to learn some effective features that are not easily discovered
or understandable by humans. DL has also proven to have higher
performance than classifiers using hand-crafted features, especially
in image recognition [15, 16]. This has motivated other research
communities to adopt DL to improve classification performance
in their work. In WF, three works have examined the use of DL
classifiers for attacks, none of which use timing information.
SDAE. Abe and Goto were the first to explore the effectiveness of
deep learning (DL) in traffic analysis [4]. They propose a Stacked
Denoising Autoencoder (SDAE) for their classifier. They used a sim-
ple input data representation composed of a sequence of 1 for each
outgoing packet and -1 for each incoming packet, ordered accord-
ing to the traffic trace. After the final packet of a trace, the sequence
was padded to a fixed length with 0s. In the closed-world setting
using the dataset from Wang et al.’s work on k-NN (100 instances
per site) [31], they achieved 88% accuracy.
Automated WF. Rimmer et al. [27] investigate the use of DL to
automate feature engineering inWF attacks. They comprehensively
study three different DL models: SDAE, Convolutional Neural Net-
work (CNN), and Long-Short Term Memory (LSTM). Furthermore,
they compare the DL models with the CUMUL attack. The attacks
were trained with very large dataset, including 900 websites and
2500 traces each. As with Abe and Goto, they use a simple data rep-
resentation with just packet direction. The results show that SDAE,
CNN and CUMUL all achieve 95-97% accuracy in the closed-world
setting.
DF. Sirinam et al. propose the Deep Fingerprinting (DF) attack,
which utilizes a deeper and more sophisticated CNN architecture
than the one studied by Rimmer et al. [29]. They evaluated their
model with a dataset containing 95 websites and 1000 traces each,
again with the simple direction-only data representation. In the
closed-world setting, the DF attack attains 98% accuracy, which is
higher than other state-of-the-art WF attacks. Moreover, they also
evaluated the performance of their attack against two lightweight
WF defenses, WTF-PAD and Walkie-Talkie. The results show that
the DF attack achieves over 90% accuracy against WTF-PAD, the
defense that is the main candidate to be deployed in Tor. OnWalkie-
Talkie, the attack achieved 49.7% accuracy and a top-2 accuracy of
98.4%.
3.3 Onion Sites
An onion service, formerly known as a hidden service, protects the
identity of a website (an onion site) or other server by making it
accessible only through special Tor connections. A client who has
the onion service’s .onion URL builds a Tor circuit and requests
to Tor to connect to the service. The client’s circuit is then linked
up with another Tor circuit that leads to the service itself. Onion
services provide various kinds of functions such as web publishing,
messaging, and chat [2].
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Onion sites may be fingerprinted more readily than regular sites.
Kwon et al. show that onion sites’ traffic can be discriminated
from regular websites with more than 90% accuracy [17]. Moreover,
Hayes and Danezis [10] find that the onion sites can be distin-
guished from other regular web pages with 85% true positive rate
and only 0.02% false positive from a dataset of 100,000 sites. There-
fore, the adversary can effectively filter out the onion sites’ traffic
from the rest of Tor traffic and applyWF attacks to determine which
onion site is being visited. Since the number of onion sites is on the
order of thousands, much smaller than the number of regular sites,
the WF attacker only has to deal with a fairly small open world
once she determines that the client is visiting an onion site. Since a
smaller open world makes the attack easier, WF attacks on onion
sites is a more serious issue compared to fingerprinting regular
websites.
In 2017, Overdorf et al. [22] collected a large dataset of onion
sites, consisting of 538 sites with 77 instances each. They evaluated
the k-NN, CUMUL, and k-FP attacks in their dataset. Their findings
reveal the set of features that are significant for fingerprinting each
site. Among timing features, packets per second was shown to be
helpful for distinguishing between the smallest 10% of onion sites.
However any further discussion of timing features was limited.
Recently, Jansen et al. [12] demonstrated how to perform an
effective WF attack from middle relays. They attain up to 63%
accuracy with the CUMUL attack in a closed world of 1,000 onion
sites.
In our paper, we explore the effectiveness of new burst-level
timing features for fingerprinting onion sites. Additionally, we are
the first to examine the effectiveness of applying more powerful
DL-based attacks, both with and without timing information, to
fingerprinting onion sites.
3.4 WF Defenses
In our work, we explore the effectiveness of WF attacks against
the state-of-the-art defenses that have been shown to be effective
with low bandwidth and latency overheads, namely WTF-PAD and
Walkie-Talkie.
WTF-PAD. Juarez et al. proposed WTF-PAD [14], an extension of
the adaptive padding technique that was originally proposed to
defend against end-to-end timing attacks [28]. WTF-PAD detects
large delays between consecutive bursts and adds dummy packets
to fill the gaps. The defense requires 54% bandwidth overhead,
though it does not directly add any delays to real traffic, and can
reduce the accuracy of the k-NN attack to below 20%. Sirinam
et al., however, show that several other attacks including DF (90%
closed-world accuracy) and k-FP (69%) perform much better against
WTF-PAD [29]. In this paper, we study how timing information can
be used to further improve attack performance against WTF-PAD.
Walkie-Talkie. Wang and Goldberg [33] propose the Walkie-Talkie
(W-T) defense, which aims to make two or more websites look ex-
actly the same to an attacker. First, W-T modifies the browser to
use half-duplex communication, in which the browser requests a
single object at a time from the server. This creates a more reliable
sequence of bursts compared with typical full-duplex communi-
cation, in which the browser makes multiple requests and then
receives multiple replies. Given each site’s expected traffic trace
through a half-duplex connection, which is expressed as a sequence
of burst sizes, W-T essentially creates a supersequence of the two
sites. This supersequence is composed of the maximum of the burst
sizes from each site. For example, if site A has a sequence of two
bursts, with sizes {3, 4}, and site B has the sequence {5, 3, 1}, then
the supersequence will be {5, 4, 1}. Then, when the user visits ei-
ther site, W-T will add padding packets to make the site’s burst
sequence match the supersequence, e.g. adding 2, 0, and 1 packets
to site A’s traffic. In theory, this ensures that both sites have the
same traffic patterns and cannot be distinguished, guaranteeing a
maximum attack accuracy of 50%. Wang and Goldberg report high
effectiveness against attacks, along with reasonable overheads: 31%
bandwidth and 34% latency. Sirinam et al. also report less than 50%
accuracy for DF against W-T [29]. Both works, however, applied
mold padding in simulation to W-T traces previously collected from
a modified Tor client.
In this paper, we examine the effectiveness of this defense more
carefully with the first experiments on a full implementation of
W-T including padding. Since W-T does not explicitly attempt to
defend packet timing information, it is interesting to explore the
effectiveness of timing features in attacks. Also, based on our ex-
periences building our W-T implementation, we report on major
challenges in designing and practically deploying W-T.
Fixed-Rate Padding. Another class of WF defenses uses fixed-rate
packet transmission, including BuFLO [9], CS-BuFLO [6] and Tama-
raw [7]. In these defenses, packets are sent at the same rate through-
out the duration of the connection, which completely hides timing
patterns and low-level burst activity. The only remaining informa-
tion for the WF adversary is the overall size of the page, which is
also partially masked. Unsurprisingly, these defenses have proven
effective against all known attacks, but also suffer from bandwidth
and latency overheads range from 100% to 300%, which is considered
too costly for deployment in Tor. In this paper, we do not evaluate
against this class of defenses, assuming that timing information
would be of no benefit to the classifier’s performance.
4 REPRESENTING TIMING INFORMATION
4.1 Timing Features
Prior work has explored using low-level timing features such as
inter-packet delay [5] and second-by-second packet counts [10],
which are not consistent from one instance to another instance of
a website. Hayes et al. compensate for this by using only high-level
aggregate statistics such as the mean or maximum. We propose a
novel set of timing features based on traffic bursts. By using bursts,
which are seen as important features in WF [10, 33], we capture
more consistent and reliable information than the low-level features
studied previously. Additionally, we employ histograms to capture
a range of statistics on these burst-level timing data, to get more
granular information than simple high-level statistics.
Figure 3: Example of four bursts of traffic (B1, B2, B3, and B4),
showing packet directions and timestamps.
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Figure 4: Interval between the Medians of Two Consecutive
Bursts: B1 : B2, B2 : B3, and B3 : B4.
4.1.1 Burst-Level Features. To better describe our burst-level
features, we will use a simple example of four bursts shown in Fig-
ure 3, where outgoing packets are labeled with "+1" and incoming
packets with "−1". The timestamps associated with each burst are
used to extract timing features. Three of our features are focused on
the timing of packets inside a single burst. The other five features
consider two consecutive bursts.
Median Packet Time (MED). The MED feature represents the me-
dian of the timestamps of each burst. Referring to the example
shown in Figure 3, for B1:
• Take the timestamps of the burst. B1: [0.0, 0.10, 0.20].
• Compute the median of these times. B1: [0.10].
Variance. This feature represents the variance of times within a
burst. For B1, we get 0.0067.
Burst Length. For this feature, we simply compute the difference
between the first and last timestamps in the burst. for B1, the dif-
ference is 0.20 − 0.0 = 0.2.
IMD. The extraction process of Inter Median Delay (IMD), the
interval between the medians of two consecutive bursts, is depicted
in Figure 4. For B1 and B2:
• Compute the medians of each burst as described for comput-
ing MED. For B1 and B2, we get 0.10 and 0.50, respectively.
• Take the difference between two consecutive bursts’ medi-
ans. For B1 and B2: 0.50 − 0.10 = 0.4.
IBD-FF. Here, IBD stands for Inter Burst Delay. This feature, IBD-FF,
is the interval between the first packets of two consecutive bursts.
For B1 and B2, we get 0.40 − 0.00 = 0.40.
IBD-LF. This feature is the interval between the last packet of one
burst and the first packet of the subsequent burst. For B1 and B2,
we get 0.40 − 0.20 = 0.20.
IBD-IFF. This features is similar to IBD-FF, but applied to two
consecutive incoming bursts. B2 and B4 are the two incoming bursts
in our example, so we get 0.75 − 0.40 = 0.35.
IBD-OFF. This feature is the same as IBD-IFF, but for outgoing
bursts. B1 and B3 are the two outgoing bursts in our example, so
we get 0.65 − 0.00 = 0.65.
Table 1: Selecting the number of bins b.
Dataset Number of Bins Tested Selected
Undefended
b=5i for i ∈ [1,10]
i = 4 (b = 20)WTF-PAD
Walkie-Talkie
Onion Sites b=5i for i ∈ [1,5]
4.1.2 Histogram Construction. To create features that would be
robust to changes from instance to instance, we further process
the extracted timing features by constructing histograms. Just as
having quartiles provides more information than just the median,
histograms allow us to capture a broader range of statistics for each
feature. Our feature processing operates in two phases: (1) pro-
duce a global distribution for each feature, and (2) use these global
distributions to populate the final feature sets for each instance.
Global Distributions. To compute the global distribution for each
of our eight features, we begin by computing the raw values of that
feature for all instances of every site. We then merge the raw data
into a single array, which we sort. This array represents the global
distribution for its respective feature. For each feature’s global
distribution, we then split the data into a histogram with b bins,
such that each bin has an equal number of items. The lowest value
and highest value in each bin then forms a range for that bin. It is
important to note that the width of each bin is not constant. For
example, considering the MED feature which represents the median
of each burst, there may be many bursts early in the trace. The
range for the first bin is thus likely to be quite narrow, going from 0
up to a small value. In contrast, the last bin is likely to have a very
wide range. We will use the ranges of the bins when we generate the
final feature sets for each instance. In our evaluations, we compute
these global distributions separately for our training, validation, and
testing datasets so as to accurately model the attacker’s capabilities.
Feature Sets. Given the histograms created from the global distri-
bution, we generate a set of features for each instance. For each
of our eight extracted feature sets, we create new histograms of
b bins. The range for each bin is given by the bin ranges of the
global distribution histograms. The count of the number of items in
each bin is normalized to the range 0 to 1, and this is then a feature
used in classification. The full feature set F then includes |F | = 8b
features, b for each of the eight timing feature types.
Tuning. The number of bins b is a tunable parameter. Using many
bins (large b) provides more fine-grained features, but it can lead
to instability between instances of the same site. Using fewer bins
(small b) is likely to provide consistent results between instances of
the same site, but it does not provide as much detail for distinguish-
ing between sites. We thus explore the variation in classification
accuracy for varying values of b. We show the search range in
Table 1. Based on our results, we selected b = 20 for all of our
datasets.
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4.2 Raw Timing Information
To better separate out the importance of timing information from
directional information, we investigate the classification perfor-
mance of using the raw time stamps of all packets in the traffic
trace. We represent raw timing information as an 1D vector to feed
into a classifier. The length of the vector is limited to 5000, as used
in prior work [29]. An instance with fewer than 5000 packets is
padded with zeroes.
4.3 Combining Timing and Direction
Information
Perhaps the most intuitive way to leverage timing information is to
combine it together with directional information and thereby take
advantage of both information sources in classification. We call this
directional timing information. Since we represent outgoing packets
with +1 and incoming packets with −1, we propose a directional
timing representation generated by simply multiplying the time
stamp of each packet by its directional representation.1
5 DATASETS
5.1 Undefended, WTF-PAD, Walkie-Talkie, &
the Onion Sites
Table 2: Number of Classes and Instances in each Dataset.
Dataset Classes Instances/Class Total
Undefended [29] 95 1000 95,000
WTF-PAD [29] 95 1000 95,000
Walkie-Talkie (sim.) [29] 100 900 90,000
Walkie-Talkie (real) 100 750 75,000
Onion Sites [22] 538 77 41,426
For undefended and defended (WTF-PAD & W-T) traffic, we use
the datasets developed by Sirinam et al. [29]. For the Onion Sites,
we use the dataset developed by Overdorf et al. [22]. The number
of sites and the number of instances of each dataset are shown in
Table 2.
5.2 Real-world Walkie-Talkie
The way in which fake timestamps are generated for the padding
packets in the simulated W-T dataset is somewhat arbitrary and
not likely to be entirely representative of real-world behavior. Con-
sequently, the performance of timing-based attacks may not be
accurately shown when assessed against this simulated dataset. In
this work, we thus created the first W-T dataset collected over the
live Tor network. To do this, we implemented the W-T burst mold
padding algorithm as a Pluggable Transport running on private
Tor bridges. We collected a dataset containing 100 sensitive sites
paired randomly with 10,000 nonsensitive sites (see Figure 5). Each
instance of a site represents one such pairing.
It is important to note that, unlike prior W-T datasets, our sensi-
tive sites are not statically paired with only one nonsensitive site.
This mimics a realistic attack scenario, since in the real world, each
user would have different pairings of sites, and the attacker would
1We call the application of directional timing in the DF classifier as the "Tik-Tok attack,"
as it is the most powerful attack we have overall.
Figure 5: Real-world W-T Website Pairing Strategy.
not knowwhich pairings a given user is applying. As a consequence
of this collection scheme, one half of the dataset (32,500) represents
instances of the client visiting a sensitive sites paired with a non-
sensitive site, while the other half represents the reverse pairing (a
nonsensitive site paired with a sensitive one). Additional details of
our W-T prototype, as well as further discussion on our experiences
with W-T, are presented in the Appendix.
6 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
6.1 Model Selection
Models for Manually Defined Features. To select an effective model
to study our proposed timing features, we performed experimental
evaluations with models used in previous WF attacks: k-NN [31]
and SVM [23]. We show the performance of our custom timing
features in Section 6.3.
In addition, we use the state-of-the-art Deep Fingerprinting (DF)
model [29] for our experiments with direction-only, timing features
(Section 6.3), raw timing information (Section 6.6), and directional
timing (Section 6.7).
DF Model Architecture. The DF model has eight convolutional lay-
ers and three dense layers. The last dense layer is the classification
layer that returns the probability of each class using softmax re-
gression. Batch normalization is used as the regularizer for both
the convolutional layers and the first two dense layers. The model
applies max pooling and a dropout rate of 0.1 after each two convo-
lutional layers. The first two dense layers also use dropout, with
respective dropout rates of 0.70 and 0.50. The model uses both ex-
ponential linear unit (ELU) and ReLU activation functions. ReLU is
used inmost of the layers, but since directional information includes
many negative values, ELU is used for the first two convolutional
layers. The default number of epochs of the model is 30. For a more
detailed review, please refer the original paper by Sirinam et al. [29]
in which the model was defined.
For experiments with direction information, we reproduced the
results reported by Sirinam et al. [29], keeping all the hyperparame-
ters as the same. For experiments with timing features or directional
timing, we do not change any hyperparameters. When training,
however, we increase the number of epochs from 30 to 100 for
the experiments with timing features and all experiments on onion
services. With timing features, there are 160 features per site, which
requires more training to find patterns effectively. For the Onion
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Sites dataset, there are only 77 instances per site, so more epochs
are needed to get the same amount of training.
For the experimentswith raw timing data, wemade three changes
to the hyperparameters: (i) We reduced the dropout rate to 0.40
for both dense layers, which increased the model’s performance;
(ii) we use the ReLU activation function for the first two convolu-
tional layers instead of ELU, since ReLU is more effective and raw
timing includes no negative values; and (iii) we do not use batch
normalization in any of the layers.
6.2 Splitting Data based on Circuits
In studying timing characteristics in WF, it is important to model
an attacker accurately. One aspect of this is that the attacker should
not have access to the same circuit as the victim for generating
training data. Wemodel this by ensuring that the attacker’s training
data is gathered over different circuits from the testing data, as well
as the validation data.
For the Undefended, W-T simulated, and WTF-PAD datasets,
Sirinam et al. explained that they collected the datasets in batches
within which each website was visited 25 times. The crawler they
use is designed to rebuild Tor circuits at the start of each batch.
Thus the number of batches used to collect the dataset corresponds
to the number of different circuits on which that data was collected.
The crawler is also configured to use different entry nodes for
each circuit. The Undefended and WTF-PAD datasets have 95 sites
with 1000 instances each and were collected over 40 batches. W-T
simulated datasets have 100 classes with 900 instances each and
were collected over 36 batches.
To correctly model the variance in timing information, we split
our dataset such that the circuits used in the training, testing, and
validation sets are mutually exclusive. We split datasets based on
8:1:1 ratio. For the Undefended and WTF-PAD datasets, instances
from the first 32 circuits are for training, instances from the next
four circuits are for validation, and instances from the remaining
four circuits are for testing. For W-T simulated datasets, instances
from the first 29 circuits are used for training, instances from the
next 3 and 4 circuits are used for validation and testing, respectively.
For the onion sites dataset, Overdorf et al. [22] mention that their
crawler creates a new circuit for each visit to crawl their dataset.
To collect the W-T real-world dataset, we similarly use our W-T
prototype (Appendix A) and create a new circuit for every visit.
Thus, for both of these datasets, it is not necessary to manually
split the dataset based on the circuits. For both datasets, we use the
same 8:1:1 ratio to split into training, validation, and testing sets.
6.3 Classification Value of Burst-Level Timing
Features
We selected and extracted eight types of burst-level timing features,
as explained in Section 4.1.
We first evaluate our eight features on the Undefended dataset.
Table 3 shows our evaluation results for thek-NN [31] and SVM [23]
models when used with our features. We also examine the perfor-
mance of each feature separately to identify the most effective
features. Our initial findings demonstrate that the most effective
combination is three features – MED, IMD, and Burst Length –
when used with b = 20 bins. As shown in Table 3, MED, IMD, and
Table 3: Closed-World: Attack accuracy of burst-level timing
featureswithk-NNand SVMagainst the undefended dataset.
Features
Classifier MED IMD Burst Length Combined
k-NN [31] 40.6% 20.1% 18.2% 50.8%
SVM [23] 56.3% 24.6% 29.1% 60.7%
Burst Length all provide different levels of classification accuracy.
Combining these features together, the accuracy reaches 60.7% with
SVM on Undefended Tor traffic.
We next apply the combination of all our eight features with
a deep learning model. In particular, we adopt the DF model pro-
posed by Sirinam et al [29]. We report the results of each of our
closed-world experiments in Table 6. Note that we do not provide
error ranges here, as we do not expect that only using our timing
features would be a competitive attack. Nevertheless, the results
show that the attack is fairly effective, attaining 84.3% accuracy
against Undefended traffic in the closed-world setting. Against the
WTF-PAD and W-T defenses, the attack achieves accuracies of
56.1% and 80.8%, respectively. Against onion sites, however, the
features get just 12.9% accuracy. We believe that the relatively low
number of training examples and the large number of monitored
websites are mainly responsible for this result.
6.4 Information Leakage Analysis
To gain a better understanding of the value of burst-level timing
features, we adopt the WeFDE [19] technique and perform an infor-
mation leakage analysis on the Undefended dataset. This technique
allows us to estimate the Shannon bits of information that are re-
vealed by particular features. This type of analysis is appealing, as
classification accuracy can fail to capture nuance in feature signifi-
cance. Although the code of WeFDE paper is publicly available, for
speed and memory requirements, we re-implemented most of the
code ourselves and validated our common results against theirs to
ensure consistency.
WeFDE can be organized into two components: an information
leakage analyzer and a mutual information analyzer. The informa-
tion leakage analyzer uses kernel density estimators to model the
distributions of features and ultimately produce an information
leakage estimate. The mutual information analyzer is instead re-
sponsible for producing metrics describing the amount of shared
information, i.e. redundancy, that features have with one another.
The mutual information analyzer is used to reduce the number of
features for leakage analysis by i) identifying features that share
most of their information with other features and are thus redun-
dant, and ii) clustering features that show moderate levels of re-
dundancy. For further details, please refer to the paper by Li et
al. [19].
For our analysis, we perform two experiments on both our fea-
tures and timing features previously defined in literature. First, we
perform an analysis of the leakage of individual features. This ex-
periment utilizes the WeFDE information leakage analyzer. These
results are shown in Figure 6. Second, we use both components of
WeFDE to estimate the information leakage of each feature category.
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Figure 6: Information leakage for individual features
Figure 7: Feature clustering analysis.
These leakages are depicted in Table 4. For this experiment, we use
the same values for the clustering threshold (0.40) and redundancy
threshold (0.90) as used by Li et al.
Results. In regards to the individual feature leakages, we find that
features in the Packets per Second category appear most significant.
The highest amount of leakage from any one feature we saw was
2.97 bits. The distribution of leakage values can be summarized as:
only 5% of features leaked more than 1.52 bits of information, 75%
of features leaked less than 1.30 bits, and 50% of features leak no
more than 0.69 bits. In general, the information leakage of most
individual timing features is low.
We encountered, however, an interesting finding during our mu-
tual information analysis. When calculating the redundancy value
of features pairwise, we found that most features have little shared
Table 4: Joint information leakage (our features*).
Feature Category Leakage (bits)
Pkt. per Second 6.56
Time Statistics 5.92
MED* 5.43
IBD-OFF* 4.38
IBD-IFF* 4.28
IBD-FF* 3.88
IMD* 3.87
Variance* 3.30
Burst Length* 3.22
IBD-LF* 3.13
information, i.e. low redundancy. The mutual information values
tended to be substantially below the clustering threshold, and as
a result, very few clusters were formed. As such, the majority of
timing features do not fall into a cluster and are thus modeled
as independent variables during the information leakage analysis.
The results of our feature redundancy and clustering analysis is
shown in Table 7. Our redundancy analysis shows that just 40 of
the 310 timing features are redundant with at least one other fea-
ture. Redundant features most often belonged to the Burst Length,
Variance, and IBD-LF categories. In addition, only 32 of the 270
non redundant features could be clustered into five groups. The
clusters primarily formed in the previously defined timing feature
categories; none of our feature categories formed clusters.
As a result of this clustering behavior, we find that the joint
leakage estimates for each category are significantly higher than
what the individual leakage results would lead us to anticipate. We
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Table 5: Closed World: Comparison of our hand-crafted Timing Features with k-FP Timing Features.
Dataset
Random Forest Deep Fingerprinting
k-FP [10] Our (§ 4.1) k-FP + Our k-FP [10] Our (§ 4.1) k-FP + Our
Undefended 87.4% 69.4% 87.3% 89.4% 84.3% 91.4%
WTF-PAD 69.3% 42.1% 69.5% 74.0% 56.1% 74.0%
Walkie-Talkie (sim.) 76.8% 70.0% 80.7% 80.3% 80.8% 80.5%
Onion Sites 36.3% 20.0% 35.5% 33.0% 12.8% 33.6%
Table 6: Closed World: Accuracy for each attack in different datasets. Error ranges represent standard deviation.
Dataset Direction [29] Timing Features (§ 6.3) Raw Timing (§ 6.6) Directional Time (§ 6.7)
Undefended 98.4±0.1% 84.3% 96.5 ± 0.3% 98.4±0.1%
WTF-PAD 91.0 ± 0.2% 56.1% 85.9 ± 0.6% 93.5±0.7%
Walkie-Talkie (sim.) 47.6±0.5% 80.8% 73 ± 20% 97.0±0.2%
Onion Sites 53 ± 1% 12.9% 66±1% 64.7±0.9%
find that the category that leaks the most information is Packets per
Second at 6.56 bits. The highest leakage for any of our new features
is MED at 5.43 bits. Overall, the low redundancy and consequently
higher combined leakage of timing features is a good indicator that
even minor features add value to the robustness of the classifier.
6.5 Comparison of Timing Features with Prior
Works
Table 5 shows a comparison between the performance of our fea-
tures andk-FP [10] timing features on our datasets.We also examine
the features’ performance with two classifiers: the k-FP Random
Forest classifier and the DF model. Our Random Forest (RF) clas-
sifier uses the same parameters as the k-FP RF classifier, but with
adjusted feature sets. The DF model follows the design described
in Section 6.
We see that our features provide less classification value than
the packets-per-second and other timing features of k-FP. When
our features are combined with k-FP features and used in the RF
classifier, we see no noticeable improvement. However, when the
combined features are instead used as inputs for the DF model,
we see a small accuracy improvement of 2% for the undefended
dataset, indicating that DL is slightly more effective at leveraging
the additional information provided by our features. This reinforces
the results from Section 6.4, which showed that our features capture
different, but related timing information.
6.6 Raw Timing Information
From the previous section, we see that using a combination of
timing features provides reasonably effective WF attacks using
traditional machine learning (ML) and especially when using deep
learning (DL). It is well known that one of the major advantages of
using DL is end-to-end learning, in which the classifier can directly
learn from the raw input, and this has been shown to provide
better performance compared to traditional ML with hand-crafted
features [30]. Thus, we explore how WF attacks, especially with
DL, could effectively perform the attacks by using only raw packet
timing.
In our experiments, we extracted the raw timing information
from our datasets and fed them to train a WF classifier using the
DF Model. We use stratified k-fold cross validation with k = 10
to obtain standard deviations for better comparison between at-
tacks. Against the Undefended dataset, the attack attains 96% accu-
racy. Against the WTF-PAD dataset, using only timing information
achieves fairly effective result with 86% attack accuracy. Attack
accuracy against W-T simulated is 73%, however, it has a very high
variance. Furthermore, in the Onion Sites dataset, we get 13% higher
accuracy using only timing information compared with using only
direction information (see Table 6).
As with DL in other domains, WF attacks using DL trained with
only timing information have better accuracies compared to our
hand-crafted timing features. In the Undefended and WTF-PAD
datasets, the attack’s respective accuracies improved by 10-25%. For
Onion Sites, we find over 50% improvement. Overall, our results
suggest several takeaways:
• Using end-to-end learning with the only timing data, the
WF classifier can effectively and directly learn more infor-
mation from the input than the timing features we propose,
leading to higher classification performance.
• Even if the only timing data is noisy, the timing information
leaves fingerprintable information that can be effectively
extracted by DL.
• Even if an attacker cannot use direction information because
of distortions in patterns caused by a defense, she can still
use timing information for an effective attack.
6.7 Directional Time
Since prior work [4, 27, 29] has shown that packet direction is
a powerful data representation for WF attacks, it should also be
considered when using timing information. We evaluated different
methods to combine timing and direction, such as using timing
features and direction together, raw timing and direction together,
and directional time. We find that directional time provides the
most effective results.
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Table 7: Real-world W-T: Accuracy for each attack against the real-world Walkie-Talkie dataset.
Combined: both monitored and unmonitored sites included in the test dataset.
Monitored & Unmonitored: the test set includes only the respective instances.
Testing Data Direction [29] Raw Timing (§ 6.6) Directional Time (§ 6.7)
Combined 70 ± 10% 60 ± 10% 70 ± 10%
Monitored 40 ± 30% 40 ± 30% 40 ± 30%
Unmonitored 95 ± 3% 70 ± 20% 95 ± 3%
With the directional-time data representation, we experimented
with WF attacks (again using 10-fold cross validation) and show
the key results in Table 6. Using directional time provides slightly
higher accuracy than that of either using only direction or only
raw timing in the Undefended dataset. Impressively, the attack
against WTF-PAD can attain 93.4% accuracy which is higher than
that of either direction or raw timing. In the Onion Sites dataset,
directional time has 12% higher accuracy than using only direction
information, slightly lower than using only raw timing information.
Finally, directional-time performs very well against simulated W-T
achieving 97% accuracy and is able to completely undermine the
defence.
6.8 Real-world W-T Evaluation
Table 7 presents attack performance when evaluated against our
new real-world W-T dataset, which is described in Section 5.2. We
present this experiment separately from both the closed-world and
open-world experiments, as the performance from this experiment
cannot be compared in a straightforward manner. This dataset
contains monitored and unmonitored site instances at an equal
proportion (35K instances each). The goal of the classifier in this
experiment is to both a) determine if visited instance is from the
monitored or the unmonitored set, and b) to determine which exact
site was visited if belonging to the monitored set. To this end,
we train our classifiers on data containing both the monitored and
unmonitored instances, and we test on either exclusively monitored
traces, exclusively unmonitored traces, or both together. If the
defense works completely as intended, the combined test set should
yield at most 50% accuracy, as the classifier should confuse site
pairs with one another.
Results. We see in Table 7 that, empirically, our W-T implementa-
tion does not provide the ideal results. The average accuracy for the
combined test set is greater than 50% for each of our three tested
attacks. When examining our implementation and output data, we
find that the cause of this shortcoming is the difficulty in exactly
matching the target burst sequence when performing bust molding
on the live network. Consequently, some information regarding
the true class instance is leaked that allows the classifier to better
distinguish between the true site and paired site. We discuss why
our burst molding fails in more detail in Appendix C.
In addition, we found that the training of the model was very
unstable, with a high standard deviation between trials for all trace
representations. This shows that while a practical implementa-
tion of W-T can not achieve ideal performance, the defense still
significantly hampers the reliability of the classifier. We also see
Table 8: Open World: Tuned for precision and tuned for re-
call. D: Direction, RT: Raw Timing, DT: Directional Time.
Dataset
Tuned for Precision Tuned for Recall
Precision Recall Precision Recall
Undefended
D 0.991 0.938 0.932 0.985
RT 0.969 0.922 0.857 0.980
DT 0.988 0.948 0.908 0.989
WTF-PAD
D 0.961 0.684 0.667 0.964
RT 0.972 0.609 0.640 0.942
DT 0.979 0.745 0.740 0.957
that direction and directional time representations achieve nearly
identical results.
6.9 Open-World Evaluation
Having explored the quality of ourmodels and baseline comparisons
of attacks in the closed-world setting, we now evaluate these in the
more realistic open-world setting.
The performance of the attack is measured by the ability of
the WF classifier to correctly recognize unknown network traf-
fic as either a monitored or an unmonitored website. True posi-
tive rate (TPR) and false positive rate (FPR) have been commonly
used in evaluating WF attacks and defenses in the open-world
setting [10, 27, 31]. These metrics, however, could lead to inappro-
priate interpretation of the attacks’ performance due to the heavy
imbalance between the respective sizes of the monitored set and
unmonitored set. Thus, as recommended by Panchenko et al. [24]
and Juarez et al. [13], we use precision and recall as our primary
metrics.
We trained the WF classifier by using the DF attack [29] as the
base model with different data representations in both the Unde-
fended and WTF-PAD datasets, including direction, only-timing,
and directional time. We did not evaluate the W-T defense in the
open-world setting, as it remains a major challenge to obtain an
open-world W-T dataset (see Appendix D).
Finally, we note that the attacks can be flexibly tunedwith respect
to the attacker’s goals. If the attacker’s primary goal is to be highly
confident that a user predicted to be visiting a monitored site truly
is doing so, the attack should be tuned for precision, reducing false
positives at the cost of also reducing true positives. On the other
hand, if the attacker’s goal is to widely detect any user that may
be visiting a monitored website, the attack will be tuned for recall,
increasing true positives while accepting more false positives.
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Table 9: Closed World: Evaluation of Slowest & Fastest Circuits.
D: Direction, RT: Raw Timing, DT: Directional Time.
Dataset
Slowest Circuits as Test Set Fastest Circuits as Test Set
D [29] RT DT D [29] RT DT
Undefended 92.90% 82.30% 92.20% 93.80% 82.50% 94.40%
WTF-PAD 68.40% 42.80% 71.10% 69.20% 44.20% 74.10%
Onion Sites 47.20% 52.90% 53.50% 41.30% 47.10% 40.60%
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Figure 8: Open World: Precision-Recall curves. Note that
both axes are shown for 0.5 and above.
Results. Figure 8 shows precision-recall curves for the attacks in
the open-world setting, while Table 8 shows the results when the
attack is tuned for precision or tuned for recall. For the Unde-
fended datasets, the results show that all data representations can
effectively be used to attain high precision and recall. The attacks
consistently performed best on the direction and directional time
data representations, with 0.99 precision and 0.94 recall when tuned
for precision. Timing alone, however, is also very effective.
On all three WTF-PAD datasets, we see reductions in both pre-
cision and recall. Nevertheless, all three datasets show over 0.96
precision and 0.60 recall when tuned for precision. Interestingly,
Figure 8 shows that directional time outperforms direction on WTF-
PAD data. Timing information appears to improve classification
of monitored versus unmonitored sites for traffic defended with
WTF-PAD.
6.10 Impact of Congestion on Circuits
Even though we split training, validation, and testing sets based on
circuits as described in Section 6.2, there can be situations where the
victim has a significantly different circuit than the ones used by the
attacker for training the classifier. In particular, circuit congestion
might be expected to especially impact timing features. To investi-
gate this, we perform two types of experiments: i) the slowest 10%
of circuits as the testing set, and ii) the fastest 10% of circuits as the
testing set. These experiments model the scenario in which the at-
tacker trains on a broad range of circuits (the other 90% of the data),
but the victim has an unusually slow or fast circuit, respectively.
To split off the slower and faster circuits for a given monitored
Figure 9: Distribution of mean circuit page load time for site
0 (Undefended dataset). Y-axis starts from 7.0.
site, we rank the circuits based on the mean page load time among
the page load times for that site. For example, the mean page load
time (in seconds) of the fastest and slowest four circuits of site 0 in
our Undefended dataset are [7.21, 7.37, 7.38, 7.40] and [9.34, 9.50,
10.37, 10.48], respectively (see Figure 9 for the whole distribution).
Among all sites in the Undefended dataset, the median gap in page
load time between the fastest and slowest circuits for the site was
5.11s (15.79s slow and 10.68s fast), showing a substantial difference
in the typical case. For the Onion Site dataset, the median gap was
much higher, at 15.69 (20.32s slow and 4.63s fast). Some Onion Site
circuits can be very quick, likely due to not needing to use exit
nodes, which can be highly congested.
We perform these experiments with Undefended, WTF-PAD, and
Onion Sites datasets. The Undefended and WTF-PAD datasets each
contain 40 circuits with 25 visits in each circuit. We take the data
from the slowest or fastest four circuits as the test set and evenly
split the rest of the 36 circuits into training and validation sets. For
the Onion Sites, each visit is from a different circuit, so we take the
10% of the slowest or fastest circuits as the test set and the rest of
the 90% circuits as the training and validation sets.
Results. As Table 9 shows, attack accuracies are lower in all sce-
narios for all datasets. Interestingly, direction is impacted almost as
much as raw timing and directional time attacks (and in some cases
more so), indicating that differences in circuit speed impact burst
patterns significantly, not just timing patterns. In most cases, test-
ing with the slowest circuits harms accuracy less than the fastest
circuits. The exception is for the Onion Sites, where the fastest
circuits can be much faster than slower ones, leading to confusion
for the attacker.
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Table 10: Information leakage for theWTF-PADdataset (our
features*).
Feature Category Leakage (bits)
Pkt. per Second 6.56
MED* 4.75
Time Statistics 4.68
IBD-IFF* 3.71
IBD-OFF* 3.68
IBD-FF* 3.51
IMD* 3.45
Variance* 1.69
Burst Length* 1.66
IBD-LF* 1.66
7 DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the reasons why WTF-PAD and W-
T have their respective levels of vulnerability to leaking timing
information.
WTF-PAD Defense. To better understand why timing information
improves attack performance in WTF-PAD, we further examined
the information leakage of timing features, as shown in Table 10.
Leakage is reduced for all feature groups except the Packet per
Second category, but some feature categories like MED have mini-
mal reduction. This indicates that the classifier is still able to find
valuable information in the timestamps of the real bursts. This intu-
itively makes sense as the timestamps of real bursts are unaffected
by WTF-PAD’s zero-delay adaptive padding. The classifier thus
needs to only learn to distinguish between the timings of real and
fake bursts to improve classification performance.
W-T. In Section 6, we showed that W-T leaks a large amount of
information from packet timestamps in the simulated setting, lead-
ing to high classification accuracies. This is because the simulated
dataset can mold bursts without affecting timestamps of real pack-
ets, leaving substantial timing information unchanged. We found,
however, a discrepancy in performance between our simulated and
real-world testing. This is likely due to the compromises that needed
to be made when practically implementing burst-molding in Tor. A
side-effect of our implementation is that inter-burst packet timing
variance is virtually eliminated and intra-burst timing variance is
reduced (see Appendix B for implementation details). Consequently,
the value of timing information is significantly lessened. We also
note, however, that as a consequence of difficulties in implement-
ing burst molding, directional information is leaked which has led
to improved performance of directional information against our
prototype.
8 CONCLUSION
In this study, we investigated the use of timing information as
a source of features to perform effective WF attacks on Tor. We
proposed eight new burst-level timing features that help illustrate
how timing can be reliably used to fingerprint sites. Through ex-
periments with ML and deep-learning classifiers, we show that
these features are robust over multiple noisy instances and provide
meaningful classification power. Furthermore, we show that these
features have low redundancy with previous studied features based
on timing.
Since we found that a range of timing features are relevant for
website fingerprinting, we then explored the capability of deep-
learning classifiers to extract and use features such as these. First, we
show that based only on time stamps and ignoring packet direction,
an attacker can achieve surprisingly good results, such as 96%
accuracy on the Undefended dataset. Moreover, we proposed the
use of directional timing, formulated by taking the product of timing
and direction data, and we show that this improves the performance
of the attack over using just direction or just timing in most settings
in the closed world. For example, on Onion Sites, directional timing
is 12% more accurate than direction alone.
In more realistic open-world experiments on undefended traffic,
using directional timing information, the attack attains 0.99 preci-
sion and 0.95 recall. AgainstWTF-PAD, it reaches 0.98 precision and
0.75 recall. These are modest improvements in attack performance
when compared to using only directional information.
In summary, our study shows that timing information can be
used as an additional input to create an effective WF attack. Fur-
thermore, developers of WF defenses need to pay more attention
to timing features as another fingerprintable attribute of the traf-
fic. Timing information seems to affect defenses in ways that are
hard to predict, so both evaluating with our attacks and performing
feature-based leakage analysis are important steps in understanding
if a defense is sound.
Resources.
The code and datasets will be released upon the publication of this
paper.
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A W-T DATA COLLECTION
In order to accurately evaluate a defense against our timing-based
attack, we require a dataset that contains realistic timestamp infor-
mation. At the time the Walkie-Talkie (W-T) defense was proposed,
Wang et. al. did not consider attacks using timing as a credible
threat against Tor traffic [33]. As such, their defense simulator did
not calculate the timestamps of dummy packets in a realistic man-
ner. To address this gap, we have developed a prototype of the W-T
defense specification that runs directly on the Tor network, rather
than simulating the padding.
TheW-T prototype is designed as a Tor Pluggable Transport (PT)
module, as an extension of the WFPadTools Framework [3]. We
developed our own implementation of the W-T padding algorithm
to use in this PT. The PT is deployed on both the client and the guard
node.2 Figure 10 shows how the W-T PT operates in the context of
the Tor network. Our prototype is intended to be used in tandem
with the Tor Browser Bundle configured with the half-duplex patch
used in Sirinam et al.’s evaluation of W-T [29].
Figure 10: Walkie-Talkie Prototype Deployment.
It is important to note that we have deployed our defense pro-
totype on the Tor Guard node since we are primarily interested
in evaluating the performance of the padding mechanism. This
deployment is vulnerable to a malicious guard node. A practical
deployment would ideally be done on the middle node so that the
security of the system is not so heavily dependent on the trustwor-
thiness of the Guard. However, this style of deployment could not
be done through a PT and would instead need to be implemented
directly into the Tor network code.
2The WFPadTools Framework operates on a Tor bridge node, but we have the bridge
act as a guard so as to not add a node to the length of the circuit.
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A.1 W-T Dataset
Using our W-T prototype, we performed a new crawl of 100 mon-
itored websites to collect a new W-T dataset. The W-T defense
creates pairs between two or more different websites and performs
padding to make the two sites look the same in terms of their packet
sequence. Wang and Goldberg’s dataset keeps the pairings the same
for the full dataset. Unfortunately, this does not accurately model
the attack. While a client should indeed use the same pairings all
the time, the attacker should not know what those pairings are in
advance.
Consequently, an attacker cannot train on a dataset that contains
only the correct pairings. The attacker must instead train on many
possible pairings of real and decoy sites. With this understanding,
we designed our real-world crawl. We first sampled a list of moni-
tored and unmonitored websites from the Alexa Top websites. We
use the top 100 sites for our monitored sites and sample 10,000 sites
from the top 14,000 for our unmonitored set. We next randomly
generated pairings between the monitored and unmonitored sites
such that each new sample to be collected is composed of a new pair.
When we collect our samples, we generate one visit for both the
sites in each pair such that samples for both the real site sequence
and decoy site sequence are represented. Based on the W-T defense,
a client chooses the decoy site. In a realistic setting, the paired
traffic between the actual website and the decoy can be variously
different among different users. Hence, an attacker needs to train
the classifier with traffic paired with variety of other sites. In this
way an attacker can test on W-T traffic of any user.
Our crawl was performed using a modified variant of the Tor
Browser Crawler [1] so as to accurately represent the browsing
behavior of the Tor Browser Bundle. The crawlers were configured
to use version 7.0.6 of the Tor Browser Bundle, patched so as to op-
erate in half-duplex mode. We deployed our W-T defense prototype
as Tor guards on virtual private servers hosted by Amazon Web
Services. Our crawlers were then configured to connect to these
servers as their guards. We collected our data in batches in which
each site was visited once. Between each batch, the decoy site to
which each real site was paired was changed, following the pairing
scheme discussed previously.
B W-T PROTOTYPE DESIGN
Designing and developing an experimental prototype of W-T led
us to face many issues that are important to understand when
designing WF defenses for Tor, and we address these in this section.
Burst Identification. Implementing W-T padding requires the de-
fense to know which burst the stream is currently on so it knows
how much padding is required. So it is necessary to correctly iden-
tify when a newW-T burst had begun. It is however difficult for the
co-operating Tor node to knowwhen the current burst coming from
upstream has ended. We solve this by implementing a half-duplex
communication mechanism in the PT. The PT allows only one side
to send data at any given time. Additionally, time thresholding is
used to identify when the current burst has ended. If no packets are
seen after a certain amount of time, the current burst is determined
to be over. This information is then signalled to the other side of
the connection by piggybacking a control message onto the last
message in the burst. These mechanisms allow both the client PT
and guard PT to remain synced to the current position in the burst
sequence.
Padding. The next decision to be made is when to send the dummy
packets in burst. If we send the dummy packets at the start of the
burst as Wang and Goldberg describe in [33], we must assume
knowledge of the real burst beforehand. In practice, we found this
results in many errors as the true burst sequence changes between
visits. Instead, we opt to send data in a burst all at once by keeping
outgoing packets in a queue until the burst ends. This provides two
benefits: 1) the number of necessary dummy packets to add can be
accurately computed using the true burst size, and 2) the inter-burst
packet timings become nearly identical and the authenticity of a
packet cannot be distinguished by timing discrepancies.
Tail Padding. Fake bursts need to be added to the trace when the
real burst sequence is shorter than the burst sequence of the decoy
site. The W-T specification gives no guidelines as to when in the
burst sequence to add these bursts. For our implementation, we sim-
ply add the fake bursts at the end of the real communication, which
we identify based on when the Tor browser closes its connection
to the proxy application.
B.1 Limitations of the Implementation
Burst Identification. Our burst identification process works well so
long as packets in a burst do not have timing differences greater than
the threshold. Unfortunately, very large timing threshold cannot
be selected without also inducing additional an additional latency
overhead. Furthermore, if the time threshold is too small, the thresh-
old may expire before any packets in the next burst have arrived.
This is most likely to occur on the co-operating Tor node as there
may be several hops worth of distance for packets to travel before
reaching and arriving from the end website. These problems can
be reduced by configuring different time thresholds for different
scenarios and tuning (eg. we don’t allow the burst to end if packets
have yet to arrive unless a much larger time threshold expires).
However, discrepancies will always exist and the PT will occasion-
ally incorrectly end bursts. When this happens, the traffic may be
segmented into more bursts than necessary which can result in
the trailing portion of the traffic to receive less padding than it
otherwise would if decoy sequence is smaller than the real site.
Overheads. The overhead of our W-T implementation is heavily
dependent on two factors: (1) the burst segmentation time threshold,
and (2) the scheme used for pairing sensitive and non-sensitive sites.
For our data collection, we used a large time threshold of 300ms
in order to minimize the number of occurrences in which a burst
is ended early. Furthermore, we made no attempt to optimally
pair sites of similar lengths. As a consequence of this, we see high
bandwidth and latency overheads when compared to their reference
sequences. When find that packet overheads average 2.21 ± 1.22
times the original sequence and time overheads average 10.13±6.48
times. In practice, these overheads likely can be reduced by more
optimally pairing similarly sized traces and by tuning the time
threshold to the minimum value that still segments burst with
reasonable accuracy.
Padding. In Appendix A we presented a padding scheme that
allows our prototype to reliably manipulate a burst sequence to
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match a target sequence by computing the necessary number of
padding packets on the fly. This scheme however has a limitation.
Dummy packets can only be added to increase the size of a burst,
real packets cannot be dropped without causing communication
errors. Consequently, in instances where dynamic content or burst
identification errors yield larger than expected burst sizes, the burst
size cannot be manipulated to match a smaller target size in this
scheme. This will inevitably result in leaks of information that a
classifier may use to better distinguish between real and decoy sites.
Tail Padding. As described in Appendix A, the W-T specification
does not indicate at what point the defense should create a fake
burst. The difficulty of adding a fake burst is that the timing of
the packets within the burst and between bursts should resemble
that of real bursts. Otherwise, the attacker needs only to identify
and filter out likely fake bursts to greatly improve their classifier’s
performance. This issue is magnified if the fake bursts are left until
the real traffic ends, as done in our implementation. If the attacker
can identify one fake burst the attacker can prune the trace to the
last suspected real burst.
C W-T EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The experimental results show that W-T is in practice weaker than
the 50% maximum attacker accuracy it claims to guarantee [33].
The cause of this discrepancy is the defender’s inability to perfectly
manipulate the traffic they produce to match their target pairing.
We note that both the original W-T dataset created by Wang and
Goldberg and the dataset developed by Sirinam et al. used traces
of half-duplex network traffic and simulated the padding [29, 33].
Given this controlled and simulated condition, the traffic from the
two websites can be formed into a supersequence via an algorithm
that is strictly followed without dealing with other factors, such as
the usual variance in burst sequences between site loads, the effect
of padding on the network connection, and the processing time on
the Tor nodes.
In contrast, our W-T dataset was directly crawled from our W-
T prototype, which was built to work with padding on the Tor
network. This not only allowed us to evaluate W-T with realistic
timestamps, but also uncovered the issues discussed in Appen-
dix B.1. The instance-to-instance changes we observed in the traces
would have led to different burst sequences than expected by the
algorithm, exposing fingerprints that could be detected by the DF
classifier. We note that W-T still maintains a lower classification
accuracy than WTF-PAD when tested against our attacks, so it
appears that the supersequence-based padding may still be more
desirable.
The effects we find from realistic conditions raise the questions
about the actual performance of defenses. While simulated padding
is useful for gathering an initial idea about a defense’s effects,
padding should be evaluated experimentally before confident judg-
ments can be made about its design.
D OPENWORLD CHALLENGE OF W-T
The fundamental concept of W-T in the open-world setting is to
attempt to confuse the classifier by creating a supersequence be-
tween a monitored website and an unmonitored website [33]. This
simple idea, however, is not easily implemented nor tested for a
few main reasons:
• Since each attacker selects his own monitored set, we can-
not expect to know what the monitored sites are. Suppos-
ing that the W-T algorithm pairs some sites that are more
likely to be monitored (sensitive sites) with those that are
less likely (non-sensitive sites), one must still test how at-
tacks perform when the attacker monitors sensitive sites,
non-sensitive sites, and a mix of both.
• Each user may have a different idea of what sites are sen-
sitive and not sensitive and should be paired together. If
pairing is random, a sensitive site might be paired with a
particularly unlikely decoy site, greatly reducing its effec-
tive protection. So finding a good approach to pairing sites
is an open challenge.
• When W-T pairs a real site A and an decoy site B, this
pairing must be kept the same for all future visits of site A.
Otherwise, the attacker will see siteA paired with different
sites and can eventually infer that A is being visited, while
the other sites are decoys. Further, the pairing must be
symmetric, such that if the user actually visited the decoy
site B, the site Amust be selected as its decoy. This could
be achieved by locally storing the mapping of decoy and
real sites, but this would need to be done carefully to avoid
leaving a record of the user’s Tor activity on the client.
Alternatively, every possible site the user could visit could
be paired up in advance, but this an enormous list of sites.
Note that W-T also requires a database of traffic traces for
every possible site, so it is already a problem before pairing
is considered.
These issues must be carefully addressed before a realistic study of
W-T in the open-world setting could be conducted. Furthermore,
the issues with the site-pairing algorithm remain major problems
to address before W-T could be deployed.
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